We consider the mix of taxes chosen by a state government to minimize reductions in employment growth. The optimal mix of taxes requires that the decrease in employment growth for an additional dollar of revenue is equal for all taxes. We test this prediction using state-level data from 1980-1994. We find the corporate income tax has a significant negative impact on employment while the sales and individual income taxes do not. Our results also suggest that states are not choosing the mix of taxes to minimize losses in employment growth with corporate income taxes set relatively too high.
INTRODUCTION
B eginning with the work of Due (1961) , numerous studies have examined the impact of state and local taxes on a number of measures of economic activity, with many of these studies focusing on employment. That this research has continued for almost 40 years can probably be attributed to two factors: the importance of taxes in the planning of state economic development policies and the lack of any consensus by early studies on the impacts of state taxes on employment or other measures of economic activity. The political importance of state tax policy can be seen by the well-publicized actions of several governors. Governor Peter Wilson's 1996-97 budget for California included a proposal to cut both the corporate and personal income tax by 15 percent with the explicit purpose of making California "more economically competitive and thereby stimulate economic performance in the state including job growth" (Szakely et al., 1996) . A few years earlier, Governor Christine Whitman of New Jersey proposed cutting the state corporate income tax from 9 percent to 7 1 /2 percent to "encourage more businesses to invest capital and employ people in New Jersey" (New Jersey Office of the Governor, 1995) .
While governors and other state officials have supported tax cuts as economic development and employment policies, economic studies on the impacts of state taxes on employment have produced mixed results. While many studies have found the expected negative impact of taxes on business activity and employment (Mullen and Williams, 1991; Crihfield, 1989 Crihfield, , 1990 Luce, 1990; Munnell, 1990; Papke, 1986 Papke, , 1991 Papke, , 1994 , numerous studies have found essentially no impact of taxes on business activity or employment (Carlton, 1979; Erickson and Wasylenko, 1980; Mills, 1983; Bradbury, 1982) . Some studies have even found that tax increases stimulate employment or production (Romans and Subrahmanyam, 1979; Deich, 1989; Eberts, 1991; Palumbo et al., 1990) .
Since the contradictory results of these studies might be in part attributable to data limitations, issues of endogeneity, and failure to fully account for the expected positive impact from services provided by tax revenue, recent studies have attempted to deal with the data limitations and econometric shortcomings of earlier studies. While some of the more recent studies still find little or even positive impacts of state taxes on employment or other measures of economic activity, the consensus seems to suggest that state and local taxes do, in fact, adversely affect employment levels in a state.
While a consensus that increases in the level of taxes and tax rates reduce state employment may be emerging from studies of the late 1980s and the 1990s, 1 as Gentry and Ladd (1994) note, "economists have devoted considerable attention to the characteristics of individual taxes, but little attention to the broader question of the appropriate mix of taxes within a governmental jurisdiction." Specifically, a limitation of most previous studies is that they ignore the impact of changes in alternative taxes on government revenue. Most recent studies incorporate state budgets into their estimation by including measures of all tax revenues and several expenditure categories usually excluding welfare expenditures (or one of the other expenditure variables) to avoid linearity. Including measures of alternative taxes (sales, income, corporate income) makes it possible to calculate the elasticity of employment with respect to the different taxes. However, comparing state taxes based on their impacts on employment while failing to calculate the related impacts on government revenue has limited value to policymakers, since choosing the mix of taxes based on employment alone (or another measure of economic activity) does not ensure that the revenue goals of the state are met. Presumably the appropriate choice of taxes must weigh the impacts of the tax on employment and other measures of the costs of taxation against its impact on government revenues. 2 We extend the existing literature on the impact of state taxes on employment by focusing on the mix rather than simply the level of taxes. Specifically, we examine the mix of the corporate income, individual income, and sales taxes, the three primary sources of tax revenue for most states, on employment. Our approach enables us to address the question of how changes in these taxes affect employment within a "balanced-budget" context. In addition to estimating the impact of state tax rates on employment we also estimate the impact of these three taxes on state government revenue. This enables us to determine whether taxes are "optimally" set in the sense that given a state revenue requirement, the mix of taxes minimizes the losses in state employment arising from taxes. By estimating the impact of taxes on both employment and revenue we can evaluate the impact of balanced-budget changes in tax rates and determine whether revenue-neutral changes in tax rates have any impact on employment within a state, a necessary condition for the mix of taxes to minimize employment losses given the state revenue requirements.
That revenue-neutral changes in the state taxes should have no impact on employment within the state follows from the first order conditions derived from our "optimal tax" model in which we consider employment maximization subject to a government revenue constraint as the objective of the state government when choosing its mix of taxes. Our focus on employment maximization represents a significant departure from the growing literature on the "efficient" mix of state taxes (Gentry and Ladd, 1994; White, 1983; Harmond and Mallick, 1994; Shannon, 1987; and Kleine and Shannon, 1986 ) that focuses on revenue growth and stability and income equality using a portfolio model. Given our focus on employment and the portfolio model studies' focus on revenue and equity, our results on the impacts of the mix of taxes on employment complement their results on the impact of the mix on equity and revenue growth and stability.
We begin with a brief review of the literature on the economic impacts of state taxation with our emphasis on recent studies that examine the impact of state taxes on employment. In the third section we develop a theoretical model in which the mix of state taxes is chosen to maximize employment subject to a government revenue constraint. The results obtained in this section form the basis for the empirical model and provide several testable implications. We discuss the data and develop the empirical model in the fourth section. The estimation procedure and results are discussed in the fifth section. Finally we offer some concluding remarks focusing on policy implications and possible extensions.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Our intent is not to review the voluminous literature on the impacts of state and local taxation on employment and economic development. Such a review, par-ticularly of the early studies, would be an unnecessary replication of the Bartik (1991) comprehensive survey of the employment literature in existence to that time, as well as Wasylenko (1997) . Instead, we discuss a few studies particularly relevant to our study. Helms (1985) examines the growth in personal income rather than employment at the state level. This study incorporates the use of a partial-adjustment model that recognizes that changes in employment are a movement from the prior year's level. In addition, he finds that the use of OLS without the incorporation of fixed effects for both states and time is inappropriate. As a result most subsequent studies, including this study, also incorporate time and state fixed-effects. The study does not, however, incorporate separate measures for the primary state taxes. Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) examine an empirical model of employment that includes separate measures of the major state taxes as well as a variable combining other tax revenue. Examining employment in five one-digit (SIC) industries in addition to total employment for periods between 1967 and 1983, they test for a structural change in the parameters between the earlier and later periods finding that the period prior to 1982 is characterized by greater responses to tax changes than subsequent periods. They, too, employ the use of a partial-adjustment model that incorporates expenditure variables and fixed effects. Only in the case of manufacturing employment were all five of the tax coefficients significant. Phillips and Goss (1995) perform a meta-analysis on the studies reviewed by Bartik (1991) . Their analysis supports the contention that overall taxes have an impact on state economic growth. They also confirm that the use of fixed-effects models for state and time effects is important when using state panel data, and support the conclusion of Bartik (1991) that at least one public expenditure variable should be included in the model. Failure to do so is found to result in an underestimate of the tax impacts. Interestingly they find that controlling for endogeneity does not significantly affect the measured tax effects.
In a recent study, Mark et al. (2000) examine the impacts of taxes on employment and population growth in the Washington, D.C. area. This study focuses on taxes within a metro area covering multiple states and examines the impact of taxes on employment growth rather than the level of employment. By using growth rates as the dependent variable, they are able to avoid potential problems of systematic differences related to the time series nature of the data as well as issues of scale. The authors also note that the traditional strategy of first-differencing to remove fixed-effects is not appropriate if one of the independent variables is correlated with the error term. As a solution, they use growth rates instead of levels and a relatively long panel. The results indicate that sales and personal property taxes negatively impact growth. Then following Mark et al. (2000) , we, too, focus our analysis on the impact of taxes on employment growth to minimize these econometric issues.
A MODEL OF STATE EMPLOYMENT
We present a simple model of the determination of employment when each state raises government revenues through the use of a sales tax and personal and corporate income taxes. This model has two purposes. First, it serves as a basis for the specification of our empirical model and provides predictions for the expected signs of coefficients from our estimation. Second, using this model we generate an optimal tax rule for state governments attempting to maximize employment given their budget requirements (constraints). This optimal tax rule is then empirically tested.
As briefly discussed earlier, a number of previous studies have examined the "efficient" mix of taxes based upon several criteria, generally including the growth rate of revenue, revenue instability, and equity. 3 In contrast, following the optimal tax literature (see Auerbach, 1985) we explicitly state a social welfare function, aggregate employment, and therefore can derive an optimal tax relationship rather than an efficiency frontier. In fact, while we consider employment maximization as our objective, it can be shown within the context of our model that employment maximization is equivalent to rent maximization, a government objective considered by numerous studies in state and local public finance. 4
Model Structure
We focus on the impacts of a single state's taxes on its level of employment. We assume that both individual workers and firms are mobile among states. This mobility gives both elastic supply and demands for labor. As we focus on aggregate employment measures in the state we treat labor as a homogenous input with all labor receiving the same wage. Then let the labor supply in state i be given by
Labor supply in state i is a function of the after-tax wage (w i (1 -τ I i )); the after-tax price of consumption goods (1 + τ S i ) ; and the (vector of) public services (G i ) with w i denoting the net wage, τ I i ,the (proportional) personal income tax rate, and τ S i , the sales tax rate. The net of tax price of commodities is normalized to one. We assume that the supply of labor in state i increases with the net wage, ∂L S i /∂[w i (1τ I i )] > 0; decreases with increases in the state sales tax rate, ∂L S i /∂τ S i < 0; and does not decrease with increases in public services ∂L S i /∂G ij ≥ 0 where G ij is the level of service j in state i. That labor supply increases with increases in the gross wage rate occurs for two reasons. First, more current residents of the state are likely to enter the labor force or increase the amount of labor they supply and, second, increases in wage rate make the state a more attractive area in which to work leading to immigration. Similar arguments, particularly with respect to interstate mobility, explain why changes in the state sales tax rate or public services influence labor supply.
Let the demand for labor in state i be given by
The demand for labor by firms located in state i depends on the wage; the gross of tax rental cost of capital (r + τ C i ) where r is the (rental) cost of capital and τ C i is the corporate income tax rate in state i; and other costs associated with being located in state i, Γ i . We assume labor demand is decreasing in the wage, ∂L D i /∂w i < 0, for two reasons. First, increases in the wage will reduce employment in existing firms within the state. Second, increases in the wage, by making the state a less profitable location will reduce the number of firms locating there if, as we assume, firms can move between states with relatively low costs. For the same reasons we expect increases in the cost of capital as a result of increases in the corporate income tax to reduce the demand for labor.
Then the equilibrium employment and wage in state i, L e i and w e i , are determined by [1] and [2] . We denote the equilibrium employment by
and the equilibrium wage by
Note that the reduced-form expression for the equilibrium level of employment in state i does not include the endogenously determined wage. Based on our assumptions regarding the aggregate demand and supply of labor in state i we have ∂L e i / ∂τ j i < 0, j = I, S, C; ∂L e i / ∂G ij ≥ 0, ∀j, ∂L e i / ∂Γ i < 0. Analogously for the wage rate we find ∂w e i /∂τ j i > 0, j = I, S; ∂w e i / ∂τ C i < 0, ∂w e i /∂G ij ≤ 0, ∀j, and ∂w e i /∂Γ i < 0. The impact of the tax rate on wages in state i depends on whether the tax is collected from the consumer/resident (personal income and sales) or from the firm (corporate income). However, increases in any of the three tax rates, in the absence of any increases in the government budget, will decrease employment in the state.
Finally in equilibrium, each state must maintain a balanced budget. For state i this means that
where R i (.,.,.) is simply the revenue function for state i.
The Optimal Mix of State Taxes
The traditional focus of the optimal commodity tax literature has been to maximize utility of a representative individual subject to a government budget constraint. However, the context for optimal taxation has generally been a single jurisdiction (nation) in which residents are immobile. When residents are mobile across two or more jurisdictions and where they live depends upon the tax policies chosen, utility maximization is a less obvious choice for an objective. Here, we posit employment maximization as a possible objective for state governments when choosing taxes. While this is not likely to be the only consideration of state governments, it is an important enough consideration to expect that employment issues would play some role in the determination of state tax policies.
As our focus is on the mix and not simply the level of taxes we follow the standard approach in optimal commodity taxation and focus on maximizing the objective, in our case employment, subject to a revenue constraint. We can characterize our problem as:
The first order conditions for [6] are [7] where µ is the LaGrange multiplier. We can use [7] to obtain
Equation [8] provides an intuitive and empirically testable condition for the mix of taxes to maximize employment. From [8], at the employment maximizing mix of taxes the decrease in employment from a marginal increase in revenue through each tax must be equal. Or, more simply, the loss in employment from an additional dollar raised by the personal income tax must equal the loss in employment from an additional dollar raised by the sales or corporate income tax.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
We have developed a model that provides a basis for a test of whether state governments are choosing their mix of taxes to minimize the employment losses associated with taxes. This model also provides insights into how we might simultaneously consider the impacts of state taxes on both employment and revenue, thereby getting a better understanding of the costs and benefits of modifications and adjustments in state tax codes. In this section we discuss the data and outline a simple empirical model that will enable us to estimate the impacts of state taxes (individual income, corporate income, and sales) on both employment and revenue.
The Empirical Model
To focus attention on the revenue-neutral impacts of taxes on employment we develop a simple empirical model of employment and revenue determination adopting the partial-adjustment model used by Helms (1985) and Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) . In this model, the equilibrium, or steady-state, level of employment is given by
where E * it is the equilibrium or steadystate employment in state i at time t. The vector τ it denotes the taxes in the state while G it denotes government expenditures and C it denotes other factors that affect the costs of production or productivity of the labor force in state i at time t. We modify the model slightly because our focus, following Mark et al. (2000) , is on the impact of fiscal policies (taxes and expenditures) on economic growth. Then we can think of employment growth (and therefore employment) as given by
Employment growth depends on both current fiscal variables and the change in these variables from period t -1 to t. Note that in a steady-state with τ it = τ i,t-1 and
Equation [11] implies that in steady-state there is employment growth and that the level of state taxes influences the rate of employment growth in a state. Following Helms (1985) and Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) equilibrium is not obtained instantaneously so that the actual growth rate in employment in time t in state i is given by
where λ denotes the speed of adjustment and dX it = X it -X i,t-1 . The error term consists of a state fixed effect, ω i , a year fixed effect, T i , and a component that varies with time and state, ε it , that we assume is normally distributed. Then with the change in employment as the dependent variable we include both the level and the change in taxes. There has been much less work, at least of a scholarly nature, on estimating revenue functions. For this reason we follow the same general model as was used with employment to obtain
where R * it is equilibrium tax revenue in period t in state i; B(.) is the tax base; and X it is a set of characteristics that affect the tax base. Then if speed of adjustment is given by θ we have
where R it and B it are the actual tax revenue and base in period t in state i. Then with a linear approximation for B(.) we have 
Data
The data are aggregated to the state level for all 48 contiguous states from 1977 to 1994. 5 With the use of lagged variables we have a sample of 722 observations from the years 1980 to 1994. These data come from a number of sources. From the Regional Economic Information System (REIS) we obtained information on state employment and gross state product. The Bureau of Census, Government Division, provided data on tax revenues and personal income used to construct the tax rates and our measures of government expenditures. We used the Current Population Survey to construct a measure of educational attainment, the average number of years of schooling for adults ages 25-64. Table 1 lists the variables, summary statistics, and a brief description. Tax rates are constructed as a percent of personal income creating an "effective" or average tax rate rather than using a statutory marginal tax rate following Helms (1985) and Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) . There are two reasons for constructing tax rates in this way. First, no single marginal tax rate applies to every household or corporation with progressive income taxes. Second, if employment responds to taxes because of interstate mobility of firms and workers, then it is the average tax rate, not the marginal tax rate, that would influence the decisions of firms and workers to move between the states. Again following Helms (1985) , Carrol and Wasylenko (1994) , and Mark et al. (2000) as well as numerous other studies, our tax measures are lagged one period. There are two reasons for lagging these tax instruments. First, it is a means for controlling for the obvious endogeneity of current tax rates given they are constructed from tax revenues themselves. Second, firms and residents are likely to base current employment and location decisions on past rather than current taxes because of the time required to relocate and change employment levels.
Charges and fees also account for 23 percent of state own-source revenues. Since we did not attempt to explicitly model the impacts of these revenue sources separately and because for many of these taxes and charges revenues are earmarked for specific purposes, they are aggregated into a single variable, Other Taxes and Charges. However, as with the other three taxes, we expect these taxes to have the same negative impact on employment when measures of public expenditures are included. To fully consider the tax burden borne by residents of a state, local taxes must also be considered. Twenty-six percent of the total state and local revenue comes from the revenues collected by local governments (own-source revenue). Sixty-four percent of this locally collected revenue is from taxes with property taxes being the primary source and 36 percent come from charges and fees. Again, since our focus is on state taxes, we aggregate local taxes, charges and fees into a single variable, Local Taxes and Charges.
Finally, since in our specification, [10], employment growth depends on both the level and change in tax rates, we include the lagged change in each of our tax measures (the change from t -2 to t -1 for an observation in year t). Then, for example, the variable name for the change in our individual income tax measure from t -2 to t -1 is ∆Individual Income Tax t-1 .
One implication of our model is that the taxes in other states will affect employment within a state. Increases in the taxes in other states, ceteris paribus, can be expected to increase employment within a state because of the mobility of the labor force and firms. Of course, one issue that needs to be considered is which states are most likely to be the states from which a state can expect to lose or gain firms and residents. We follow the practice of Besley and Case (1995) and Case (1993) , in a somewhat different context, and consider the contiguous states as the sources of immigration or emigration of firms and residents. To account for the impacts of other states' tax policies on employment on a state we create an average, weighted by population, of all the contiguous states' total state taxes (as percentage of income), Neighboring States Taxes. Inclusion of this variable requires that Alaska and Hawaii be excluded.
As measures of the public services residents receive and public inputs that are used by firms in a state, we include public expenditures on education, hospitals, and highways. Consistent with our tax measures, public expenditure variables are also constructed as a percentage of income and lagged as well. Unlike the majority of studies 6 on taxes and employment we do not include the wage rate as an explanatory variable in the base model. Since the wage is presumably affected by the taxes set by the state, inclusion of the wage in the model would suggest that the entire burden of the individual income tax was borne by employees and the incidence of the corporate income tax is borne by the firms. In addition, the wage rate is presumably endogenous. Therefore, instead of including the wage or a predicted wage we include a measure of productivity (mean years of education) and the extent of labor force participation (female participation rate). 7 While including these measures may proxy for productivity, the wage rate, itself, measures productivity. 8 This, then, argues for including the wage rate in the model. Thus, to provide more comparability to the prior literature and in the spirit of completeness, the model is estimated with the wage rate, lagged one period, included in an alternate specification.
Finally, as a proxy for the tax base for a state we include Gross State Product in the revenue equation. Clearly it would be optimal to employ the exact tax base measure for the three taxes in question rather than simply gross state product. However, it is obvious that no single consistent measure could be found to proxy the tax base for each of the taxes that would be consistent across the 48 states. Given the extent that exclusions from the sales tax base or deductions for income tax vary among states, deriving a consistent measure of each individual tax base would be extremely difficult if not impossible. In the absence of precisely measured individual tax bases, we use as broad a base as possible, gross state product.
For the employment equation, the dependent variable is the logarithmic transformation of employment growth, ∆LN(Employment) = LN(Employment t ) -LN(Employment t-1 ). For the revenue equation, the dependent variable is the logarithmic transformation, LN(Revenue). 9 We include a variable measuring the weighted average of the taxes of surrounding states since we believe that the surrounding states are the most obvious competitors for business. Of course, border states' tax rates will also affect crossborder shopping and residential location. However, to the extent that a state has an international border, its 'competition' is different than those states that border only other states subject to the same U.S. rules. We find that our estimates seem to be particularly sensitive to inclusion of small states (in population) on the U.S.-Canada border even with the inclusion of state fixed-effects. Further, given the significant differences in tax policies as well as limitations on international trade and labor and capital mobility, we cannot simply incorporate Canadian taxes into the variable Neighboring State Taxes. Given both these conceptual difficulties and the sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of these small states on the Canadian border, we estimate the model for 43 states as well as for 48 states. In addition to excluding Alaska and Hawaii, the states of Idaho, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Vermont are also excluded in this alternative sample. 6 Again, Helms (1985) and Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) are examples. 7 The existence of right to work laws have been used in the prior literature as a proxy for union influence or the presence of "pro-business" state policies designed to lower business costs such as wages (Holmes, 1998) . In our sample of state-level data, however, only one state (Idaho) experiences variation in this variable. 8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention. 9 While we did not undertake any formal determination of the appropriate functional form, we also estimated these equations using Employment and Revenue as the dependent variable rather than their logarithmic transformations. The results were qualitatively similar but the fit of the equation and precision of estimates was weaker than found when using the logarithmic transformation.
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE AND RESULTS
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the employment and revenue equations are found in Table 2A for the 48 state sample and for the 43 state sample in Table 2B . 10 While alternative estimators may outperform maximum likelihood in small samples, none have better asymptotic properties (Hsiao, 1986, p. 40-1) . Use of maximum likelihood estimation also provides for direct easily performed cross-equation tests of restrictions on coefficients. One econometric difficulty that arises when estimating fixed-effect models with lagged dependent variables (dynamic models) occurs if there is auto-correlation (Nickell, 1981; Hsiao, 1986; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988) . In this case, standard panel estimation procedures (including our approach) will yield inconsistent estimates. However, since the bias is on the order of 1/T where T is the number of years (Greene, 2000, p. 582-3) and we have 16 years of observations, this should be less of a problem in our study than in studies over a shorter time period. Further, as Mark et al. (2000) discuss, inconsistency is more likely to be a problem when estimating levels rather than rates of growth as we do. (2) gives the results when Wage is included. Before examining the coefficients on the tax rates, we see from the coefficient on the lagged change in the log of employment (∆LN(Employment t-1 )) strong support for the partial-adjustment model. In both samples, with and without the wage, the coefficient on ∆Employment t-1 is statistically significant and between .38 and .51-well within the theoretically consistent range of zero and one.
Examining the results for our 43 state sample (Table 2B ) we find the coefficients on the state taxes are as expected, with the exception of the coefficient on Sales Tax, which is positive but statistically insignificant when Wage is included. In the sample of 43 states the coefficient on Corporate Income Tax is statistically significant and negative both with and without the inclusion of Wage. In the sample of 48 states, the coefficient on Corporate Income Tax remains negative, but is no longer statistically significant. Local Taxes and Charges is also highly significant and negative when Wage is included. This result is obtained for both samples. When Wage is not included, however, this variable becomes statistically insignificant. Neither the coefficients on Individual Income Tax nor on Other Taxes and Charges were statistically significant in any of the estimations but were consistently negative. However, Individual Income Tax, with a tstatistic of -1.46 was marginally significant in the 43 state sample when Wage was excluded.
While the impact of Neighboring State Taxes is positive across all estimations, it is not statistically significant in any of them. For the change in tax rate variables, the coefficients are statistically significant and positive for ∆Corporate Income Tax and statistically significant and negative for ∆Sales Tax across all the estimations. 11 The other change in tax variables are insignificant in all estimates.
Examining the expenditure variables, the coefficient on Education is positive but statistically insignificant when Wage is included. When Wage is not included, however, it becomes significant and positive. Hospital expenditures have a negative but statistically insignificant impact in all estimates. The coefficient on Highway expenditures is statistically significant and negative in all the estimates, with the exception of that with the 48 states when Wage is included (Table 2A , Column (2)). A likely explanation for this unexpected result is that the omitted government expenditures have a stronger positive impact on employment than Highway or Hospital expenditures. 12 Educational Attainment also has a positive impact as expected, but again is statistically insignificant across all estimations. The coefficient on Female Participation Rate is negative across all estimations and is statistically significant when Wage is not included. Energy costs have an unexpected positive coefficient, perhaps because of supply rather than demand con-siderations. The coefficient on Wage is negative and highly significant as would be expected.
From these estimates of the employment equation, a few relationships become apparent. First, in the 43 state sample Corporate Income Tax is statistically significant with and without the inclusion of Wage and is the only measure of the level of taxes that is significant in both specifications. Second, in both samples when Wage is included the impact of Local Taxes is statistically significant and negative. The ∆Corporate Income Tax and the ∆Sales Tax variables are statistically significant in both samples and both specifications. The expenditure and labor related variables are all consistently less statistically significant when Wage is included as would be expected since these factors should theoretically affect employment through impacts on the wage rate. The consistently statistically-significant negative impact of Highways is unexpected and warrants investigation in future research. The strong negative impact of Female Participation when Wage is not included is also interesting and should be examined in more detail in future wage research.
Tables 2A and 2B also report the results from estimating a very simple form of the revenue equation. Not surprisingly, the tax rates have a positive impact on revenue. 13
Tests of Employment Maximization
As developed in the third section, employment-maximizing policies, given a fixed budget constraint, imply the ratio of 11 It is necessary that the model incorporate both of these measures in the level and change in tax rates since it is necessary to obtain the steady-state impact of the taxes. As noted by Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) , it is unlikely that the impact of taxes remains totally consistent over time. (They found a decreasing impact to the taxes.) In order to continue testing, since the model incorporates the change in employment as a dependent variable, it is necessary that the steady-state impact be separated. 12 Carroll and Wasylenko (1994, p. 24 ) provides a formal discussion of how to incorporate the government budget constraint into the empirical model. Essentially one category of expenditures or taxes must not be included. 13 Estimates of ∆(LN[Revenue]) as a dependent variable lead to very unusual results. the marginal impact of tax increases on employment growth to the marginal impact of the tax on revenue must be equal for all taxes. As we are interested in whether the mix of taxes minimizes employment losses in the steady-state equilibrium in which dτ s = dτ I = dτ C = 0, we only compare the impacts of a balancedbudget change in the level of taxes. Formally, we test whether [16] where, again, β j is the coefficient on τ j in employment equation and γ j is the coefficient on τ j in the revenue equation. Table  3 reports the results of these tests. To perform the test of whether the ratio of coefficients for all three taxes are equal, in addition to our unconstrained model we estimate a model in which this ratio of coefficients for all taxes is constrained to be equal. The test, in this case, is simply a test of the difference in log-likelihood ratios. The results of this Chi-square test, reported in Row (1), indicate that with a high degree of confidence (p-value < .05), the employment impacts of the individual income tax and corporate net income tax and general sales tax are not equal in the 43 state sample. For our sample of 48 states, the null hypothesis that the mix of taxes is optimally set is not rejected. As shown in Row (2), it can be said that the individual income tax and corporate income tax ratios are statistically different only in the case of the 43 state sample with Wage (Column (4)) though when Wage is not included with 43 states, the test statistic is marginally significant with a pvalue of .1207 (Row (2), Column (3)). When Wage is included in estimation with the 48 state sample the p-value for this test is .1692, also marginally significant (Row (2), Column (2). Comparing the ratios for the individual income tax and the sales tax (Row (3)), the hypothesis of equality cannot be rejected in any of the models. The comparison between the corporate income and sales tax (Row (4)) results in rejection of the null of equal ratios in both of the 43 state estimations and is marginally significant in the 48 state estimation with Wage included. Both estimates with the 43 state sample find the difference in the ratio of coefficients for the sales and corporate income tax to be highly significant (p-value < 0.1 in the fourth column and p-value < 0.5 in the third column).
While the results of these empirical tests indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in the balanced budget impact of the different taxes on employment, we might also consider the economic significance of our results. Using the employment and revenue equations we can determine the employment impacts of balanced budget shifts in tax revenue sources. From these equations we have [17] Equation [17] gives the change in the growth rate in employment in state i from year t -1 to t as a result of decreasing revenue collected from tax j by dR it /R it and increasing revenue collected from tax k by the same amount where the change in revenue is a percentage of total tax revenue. 15 Using the coefficients for the tax rates from the employment and revenue equations for the 43 state sample excluding the wage rate (Table 2B , column (1)) we calculate the percentage change in the growth rate for employment for changes in the sources of revenue equaling 1 percent, 2 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent of total revenue. The results of this experiment are in Table 4 .
Of course, our approximation of the change in the growth rate for employment is linear in the percentage change in revenue so reporting the results for 2 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent changes in revenue are simply greater than the results for a 1 percent change in magnitude by factors of two, five, and ten respectively. In row (1) of Table 4 the percentage change in the growth rate of employment for a decrease in the corporate income tax rate with a balanced-budget increase in the individual income tax rate are given. A change in rates such that 1 percent less of state revenue is collected from the corporate income tax rate and 1 percent more is collected from the individual income tax rate would increase employment growth by .28 percent. For tax rate changes that result in a shift of 10 percent of state revenues, we obtain a 2.83 percent change in the growth rate of employment. Then using the average state employment growth rate of 2.04 percent per year in our sample, a shift in revenue collections of 10 percent from corporate to individual income taxes would increase this growth rate to approximately 2.10 percent. As Table 4 indicates, shifting from the corporate income tax rate to the sales tax rate will have a similar, though slightly greater, impact on the growth in employment. Shifts in collections from individual income to sales taxes will have little impact on employment.
While the impacts of these shifts in sources of tax revenue are by no means large, they should not be dismissed as insignificant, particularly when we consider their impacts over a longer period of time.
In Table 4 , we also report projections in the difference in the state level of employment as a result of these shifts in revenue sources for ten and 20 year time horizons using a growth rate in employment of 2.04 percent as our base in the absence of any change in tax policies. As rows (4) and (7) of the table indicate, a revenue shift of 10 percent from the corporate income tax to the individual income tax would result in the level of employment being 0.69 percent higher in ten years and 1.71 percent higher in 20 years. Overall, the results of these tests suggest that the employment-maximizing mix of taxes should consist of lower rates on corporate income relative to sales tax rates. When the small states bordering on Canada are not included, presumably eliminating border concerns, it also appears that rates on corporate income should be lowered relative to the individual income tax.
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND EXTENSIONS
The actual determination of the mix of taxes chosen by states is undoubtedly an imperfect and complicated exercise in both economic and political tradeoffs. While there are a number of considerations for a state when setting not only the level, but also the mix, of taxes, employment would certainly be expected to be one. To the extent that employment is considered when taxes are chosen, the impacts of the alternative taxes on both employment and government revenues must be considered.
Here, we extend the work of numerous researchers on the impact of taxes on employment by explicitly considering the impact of these taxes within a balancedbudget framework with employment and revenue jointly estimated. This joint estimation enables us to test whether taxes appear to be set at a level that maximizes employment given the revenue needs of the states.
Our results indicate that the corporate net income tax has statistically significant negative impacts on the rate of growth in employment. While we find a negative impact on employment from increases in the individual income tax and sales tax, these results are not statistically significant. Over a relatively long time horizon, such as 20 years, our results indicate that a revenue shift of 10 percent away from the corporate tax to either the sales or in-dividual income tax would result in a change in employment of approximately 1.7 percent. Given the apparent lack of equality in the employment-revenue tradeoff of the taxes, one possible extension might be to examine employment at a more disaggregated level. Perhaps, it is not aggregate employment but higher paying employment, possibly manufacturing employment that might be the focus of state tax policies.
In this paper, we formally model and attempt to empirically control for the impacts of other states' taxes on employment within a state. We find little evidence that these taxes matter. However, another possible extension might be to examine whether neighboring state taxes matter in border counties using county-level employment data along the lines of Fox (1986) or Holmes (1998) . In addition, we also find that our results are very sensitive to the inclusion of small states bordering Canada. This may suggest interesting international trade patterns influencing the impact of taxes on employment in these states. This, too, seems to be a topic that merits further research.
